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David Chalmers has recently received much attention for 
arguing against a materialistic theory of mind and for a 
type of property dualism (see Chalmers 1996). So what 
exactly is a materialistic theory? According to Chalmers, 
materialistic theories require, roughly speaking, that all 
facts, including macrolevel facts, either are microphysical 
facts or supervene logically on microphysical facts (Chal-
mers 1996, 41, 128). For instance, biological facts logically 
supervene on basic physical facts. But how does Chalmers 
understand supervenience? After explaining the basic idea 
and discussing some technical problems, he provides the 
following gloss: „[supervenience is] a thesis about our 
world (or more generally, about particular worlds)... 
According to ... [this] definition, B-properties are logically 
supervenient on A-properties if the B-properties in our 
world are logically determined by the A-properties in the 
following sense: in any possible world with the same A-
facts, the same B-facts will hold“ (Chalmers 1996, 39).1 
Utilizing many creative examples invoking objects such as 
zombies, he contends that mental phenomena, and con-
scious experiences in particular, do not supervene on 
material states of affairs. Consciousness, then, is unlike 
just about every other natural phenomenon, which does 
supervene on materialistic states of affairs. Hence con-
sciousness is special, different, and, in accord with his 
dualism, separate. 
In this paper, I shall not explicitly examine the examples 
and arguments that Chalmers proffers to show that 
consciousness does not supervene on physical facts; that 
battle has already been joined by a host of other philoso-
phers. What I want to do instead is to challenge his 
general claim that (just about) every other macrolevel 
property does supervene on microphysical facts2 by 
attacking one of his key supports for this claim and 
showing how it contains epistemological presuppositions 
that actually undermine his general supervenience claim. 
After setting up the theoretical machinery necessary for 
him to argue that consciousness does not supervene on 
physical facts, Chalmers feels the need to address the 
„frequent response“ that „... conscious experience is not 
alone here, and that all sorts of properties fail to supervene 
logically on the physical. It is suggested that such diverse 
properties as tablehood, life, and economic prosperity 
have no logical relationship to facts about atoms, electro-
magnetic fields, and so on. Surely those high-level facts 
could not be logically entailed by microphysical facts“ 
(Chalmers 1996, 71)? He replies that „it is not hard to see“ 
(Chalmers 1996, 71) that this line of reasoning fails and 
thus he concludes that „[c]onscious experience is almost 
unique in its failure to supervene logically. The relationship 
between consciousness and the physical facts is different 
in kind from the standard relationship between high-level 
and low-level facts“ (Chalmers 1996, 71). Chalmers offers 
three different types of arguments to support his thesis, 
                                                     
1. Actually Chalmers gives several different definitions of supervenience, all 
of which he considers to be roughly equivalent (Chalmers 1996, 71). 
2. Chalmers entitles one sub chapter (2.5) “Almost Everything is Logically 
Supervenient on the Physical”.  
which derive from considerations of conceivability, epis-
temology, and analyzability.  
Let us look briefly at the core ideas behind these argu-
ments. The essence of Chalmers’ first argument is 
encapsulated in the following sentence: „A world physically 
identical to ours, but in which ... [macro] facts differ, is 
inconceivable“ (Chalmers 1996, 73). Epistemologically he 
contends that „... someone in possession of all the 
physical facts could in principle come to know all the high 
level facts ... “ (Chalmers 1996, 76). On the flip side, if the 
macro facts of the world were not logically supervenient 
then we would have a „special skeptical problem“ 
(Chalmers 1996, 74). Finally, he argues that „... most high-
level concepts ... are generally analyzable to the extent 
that their intensions can be seen to specify functional or 
structural properties“ (Chalmers 1996, 81). Others have 
attacked Chalmers’ case that high-level facts logically 
supervene on physical facts. Alex Byrne (1999) for 
example has not only specifically attacked Chalmer’s 
conceivability argument and his argument that knowledge 
of all microphysical facts could lead one to knowledge of 
all macro facts, but also maintained that analyzability 
considerations fail to establish the supervenience claim 
(although this latter argument does not specifically target 
Chalmers, it clearly challenges his own appeals to 
analyzability). While Chalmers has disputed some of 
Byrne’s specific attacks, he also finds Byrne’s discussion 
deficient because it „... passes over the role of epistemo-
logical considerations regarding the elimination of skeptical 
scenarios“ (Chalmers and Jackson 2001, 334, note 16). 
Because no one has to the best of my knowledge dis-
cussed this argument that Chalmers suggests is important 
for his overall strategy, and because this argument actually 
undermines Chalmers’ strategy, it is important to examine 
it closely. 
In short, Chalmers endeavors to push those who deny 
his thesis into a dark skeptical corner: 
... if there were a possible world physically identical to 
ours but biologically distinct, then this would raise radical 
epistemological problems. How would we know that we 
were not in that world rather than in this one? How 
would we know that the biological facts in our world are 
as they are? To see this, note that if I were in the alter-
native world, it would certainly look the same as this 
one. It instantiates the same distribution of particles 
found in the plants and animals in this world; indistin-
guishable patterns of photons are reflected from those 
entities; no difference would be revealed under even the 
closest examination. It follows that all the external 
evidence we possess fails to distinguish the possibilities. 
Insofar as the biological facts about our world are not 
logically supervenient, there is no way we can know 
those facts on the basis of external evidence.  
In actuality, however, there is no deep epistemological 
problem about biology. We come to know biological 
facts about our world on the basis of external evidence 
all the time, and there is no special skeptical problem 
that arises. It follows that biological facts are logically 
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supervenient on the physical. ... There is no special 
skeptical problem about knowing these facts on the 
basis of external evidence, so they must be logically 
supervenient on the physical (Chalmers 1996, 73-74). 
This argument is not entirely perspicuous. But presumably 
we can state its skeletal structure along the following lines: 
(1)  If the macrolevel does not supervene on the mi-
crophysical, then we would have no perceptual 
knowledge of macrolevel facts. 
(2)  We do have perceptual knowledge of macrolevel 
facts. 
He concludes (by modus tollens)  
(3)  The macrolevel does supervene on the micro-
physical. 
The implication of this argument is that our general 
perceptual knowledge and our more specific knowledge of 
the sciences (e.g., biology) rests upon the truth of the 
logical supervenience thesis. 
Let us begin our examination of this argument by asking, 
What justification does Chalmers give for (1)? Recall his 
words: „... if I were in the alternative world, it would 
certainly look the same as this one. ... It follows that all the 
external evidence we possess fails to distinguish the 
possibilities. Insofar as the biological facts about our world 
are not logically supervenient, there is no way we can 
know those facts on the basis of external evidence“ 
(Chalmers 1996, 74). Chalmers’ case here is unconvinc-
ing. Imagine a world that is physically identical to ours yet 
distinct in the biological realm at only one point; that is, 
suppose that a biological fact failed to obtain despite an 
„appropriate“ microphysical base for some isolated bacte-
rium, say, at the bottom of a canal in Bruges, Belgium in 
1800. Even one such failure would be enough to show that 
there is no supervenience because supervenience is an all 
or nothing affair, like deductive entailments. Nevertheless, 
suppose that there is a law of nature that 99.999999... % 
of the time the biological fact is „fixed“/“determined“ by the 
physical basis. Surely there would be biological knowledge 
in such a world even though, strictly speaking, biological 
facts did not supervene on microphysical facts. One can 
know, via perception for instance, the biological fact that a 
lady bug crawling on one’s plant is alive. So (1) is false. 
Moreover, even if Chalmers could respond to this 
argument, (1) is still not out of the woods. For by contrapo-
sition, (1) entails  
(1*)  If we have knowledge of macrolevel facts (e.g., 
biological facts), then these facts supervene on 
the basic microphysical facts. 
Consider, though, a possible world very similar to the 
movie Ghostbusters. In one scene a giant doughboy is 
stalking the streets of a large city in view of everyone. If I 
understand the movie correctly, then this giant doughboy 
is a form of life constituted by ectoplasm,3 which is not a 
natural substance even on Chalmers’ account.4 But surely 
people seeing this giant ectoplasmic entity prowling the 
streets of their city know that this living being exists and is 
potentially dangerous just as they would know by percep-
tion if a giant, physically constituted, dinosaur-like reptile 
                                                     
3. And even if the movie is silent about the constitution of this entity or 
specifies some other constituting substance, it is clear that this is a supernatu-
ral being by anyone’s definition. 
4. He lists “angels, ectoplasm, and ghosts” as examples of “nonphysical 
stuff not present in our own world” (Chalmers 1996, 39). 
were stalking their streets. And knowledge of this high-
level fact is obtainable despite the lack of supervenience. 
Thus (1*) is false, as is (1) itself.  
Now some might protest that such a world is not possi-
ble. After all, just because something appears on a Holly-
wood screen, it does not mean that it is true or even 
possibly true. But this response is not open to Chalmers 
because he allows that it is logically possible that angels 
and other supernatural entities exist (Chalmers 1996, 39). 
Moreover, if such entities exist in a world, then presumably 
they exit in a physical location. And if an entity could have 
a physical location, then it seems conceivable that it could 
exert causal influence on the world and thus be detected 
or seen. It seems safe to say that (1) is in deep trouble and 
Chalmers’ argument from epistemology at the very least 
needs major repairs or elaborations. 
Finally, and most importantly, Chalmers’ attempts to 
„back up“ his points about scepticism seem to backfire and 
offer us a backdoor way to show how his general super-
venience thesis fails by his own standards. Chalmers 
claims that „ ... in areas where there are epistemological 
problems, there is an accompanying failure of logical 
supervenience, and that conversely, in areas where logical 
supervenience fails there are accompanying epistemologi-
cal problems“ (Chalmers 1996, 74). Chalmers claims that 
„two problems exhaust the epistemological problems that 
arise from failure of logical supervenience on the physical“ 
(Chalmers 1996, 75): causation and other minds. With 
regard to the latter he claims that „... the mere prima facie 
existence of the problem is sufficient to defeat an episte-
mological argument, parallel to those above, for the logical 
supervenience of consciousness. By contrast, there is not 
even a prima facie problem of other biologies, or other 
economies“ (Chalmers 1996, 74). In short, according to 
Chalmers there is no prima facie epistemological problem 
with coming to know most high-level facts, so there must 
be logical supervenience. Chalmers gives no definition of a 
prima facie epistemological problem; but if other minds and 
causation present prima facie problems, then surely the 
external world does as well. And at least some epistemo-
logical worries about biology, say, are just an instance of a 
more general worry about our perceptual knowledge of the 
external world. So if Chalmers sticks to his guns and 
maintains that „ ... in areas where there are epistemologi-
cal problems, there is an accompanying failure of logical 
supervenience“ (Chalmers 1996, 74), then the epistemo-
logical problem of the external world shows (pace Chal-
mers) a failure of supervenience.  
Chalmers overlooks this problem because he mischar-
acterizes the essential nature of the problem of the exter-
nal world. He says that these worries are in some sense 
prior to the problems of causation and other minds „... 
because they concern the existence of physical facts 
themselves... It is compatible with out experiential 
experience that the world we think we are seeing does not 
exist; perhaps we are hallucinating, or we are brains in 
vats“ (Chalmers 1996, 75). He thus thinks that he can do 
an end run around this problem by giving himself „the 
physical world for free... thereby assuming that the 
external world exists“ (Chalmers 1996, 75, 76). But the 
problem of the external world is not necessarily connected 
to the possibility that the external world does not exist and 
thus it cannot be avoided simply by assuming that the 
external world exists. Brain in vat scenarios (à la The 
Matrix) for example do not question the existence of an 
external physical world, but our access to the true facts 
about it. Even the way that Chalmers attempts to dismiss 
any deviation from his general supervenience claims tacitly 
underscores this point. For recall that in considering a 
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world without his type of logical supervenience, Chalmers 
asks, „How would we know that we were not in that world 
rather than in this one“ (Chalmers 1996, 73)? If answering 
this question is supposed to be a problem for those who 
would deny his supervenience claims, then it provides a 
problem for Chalmers as well. For, according to Chalmers’ 
own hypothesis, a world with logical supervenience will 
appear the same to a cognizer as the world lacking logical 
supervenience. As he puts it: „... if I were in the alternative 
world [that lacks logical supervenience], it would certainly 
look the same as this one“ (Chalmers 1996, 73; Chalmers’ 
emphasis). So how does Chalmers know that he is in the 
world with logical supervenience? Saying „I clearly have 
biological knowledge, so there must be logical superven-
ience“ simply begs the question and fails to address the 
prima facie problem as even he sets it up. Given that (i) 
Chalmers claims that even prima facie epistemological 
problems reveal a lack of logical supervenience, (ii) Chal-
mers admits that there is at least a prima facie episte-
mological problem concerning the external world, and (iii) 
Chalmers’s strategy to avoid this problem is based on a 
misdiagnosis of the true nature of the sceptical threat, we 
should conclude that Chalmers own epistemological 
principles lead us to reject his principle of logical super-
venience. 
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